Build on the supported package contract
Use @absolutejs/agent-exchange-permissions through its supported public entry points.
@absolutejs/agent-exchange-permissions
@absolutejs/agent-exchange-permissionsv0.2.0betaAIService profiles and owner-approved reusable permissions for secure Agent Exchange.
#Installation
BASH
bun add @absolutejs/agent-exchange-permissions#Capabilities
Overview
Reusable allow-once / always-allow / deny orchestration for Agent Exchange signed mandates. Use trusted service profiles, an authenticated mailbox owner, and the Agent Exchange WebAuthn adapter to approve the exact returned draft.
createAgentExchangePermissionManager owns draft creation, profile matching, service revision invalidation, approval, denial and revocation. One-use grants last 15 minutes. Saved grants last 30 days with at most 100 uses; disclose these limits before requesting approval. Non-routine profiles cannot use saved approval.
createPostgresAgentExchangePermissionStore scopes records by tenant and owner. Install AGENT_EXCHANGE_PERMISSIONS_POSTGRES_MIGRATION and the Mandate Stores migration before use. Reuse excludes exhausted/revoked mandates. Actual execution must still call the signed mandate authority's authorize (which atomically consumes a use), and check assertActive before each sensitive stage. A permission lookup alone does not authorize secret access.
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New services must be supplied as trusted, validated configuration. Unknown IDs are rejected. Change revision or adapterRevision when sender matching, destination, action, or other semantics change. Exact HTTPS origins only; no wildcards. Profile labels and all grant fields participate in scope matching. Approvals do not create source or destination adapters or bypass their validation.
The host app supplies company/task eligibility, validated authenticated principals, passkey ceremonies, and a UI. Never send the stored draft or signed mandate in public status responses. List permissions only for the authenticated owner. A requester cancelling one request must not revoke a mailbox owner's saved grant.
Deny rejects the pending request only. It does not create a permanent block. To stop previously saved access, revoke that grant separately. Revocation prevents future stages and cannot recall an already dispatched provider operation.
Saved permissions may be explicitly enabled for routine or authentication profiles. Authentication grants remain bound to the exact owner, requester, mailbox, origin, operation and profile/adapter revision. They require owner passkey approval and expire after 30 days or 100 uses. Recovery and other security-changing risks cannot enable saved permission. Hosts must classify operations honestly and recheck active access before every execution.
Outcomes
What you can build
Hardening checklist
Production guidance
Make every external boundary explicitPin the deployed @absolutejs/agent-exchange-permissions version, replace example or memory-backed dependencies with durable implementations, bound external calls, protect credentials, and emit enough evidence to retry or recover safely.
Follow in order
Troubleshooting path
1
Trace from the first failed boundary
Reproduce the smallest canonical @absolutejs/agent-exchange-permissions example, confirm the supported entry point and version in the API explorer, then inspect the first boundary that did not produce its documented result.
#Public entry points
Supported entry points declared by this package manifest.
@absolutejs/agent-exchange-permissionsPackage entry point declared in package.json.
#Package commands
Scripts declared by this package manifest.
bun run buildrm -rf dist && bun build src/index.ts --outdir dist --root src --sourcemap --target=browser --external @absolutejs/agent-exchange && tsc --project tsconfig.build.json
bun run check:packagebun run format:check && bun run typecheck && bun run test && bun run build
bun run formatprettier --write "./**/*.{ts,json,md}"
bun run format:checkprettier --check "./**/*.{ts,json,md}"
bun run testbun test tests/
bun run typechecktsc --noEmit